The agent authenticated successfully.
It still wasn't allowed to do that.
A deployment agent holds valid credentials for a production
database. It proposes DROP TABLE production_customers. Every identity check passes.
This page runs that request through the real EVE CoreGuard evaluator and shows you what happens
next — then runs a permitted query from the same agent with the same credentials.
Run it
Pick a scenario. The verdict is produced by the deployed CoreGuard evaluator
against the autonomous_agent_v1 policy pack — deterministic rules, no language
model anywhere in the decision path.
Execution proof
These counters are owned by the protected executor and the simulated database, and are read back after the attempt. They are not set by this page.
What actually happened
✗ Blocked
✓ Allowed
Same agent. Same credentials. Different authorization. That is the distinction identity infrastructure cannot make on its own — a credential says the agent is who it claims to be, not that this particular action against this particular resource is permitted right now.
The enforcement path
AI agent ↓ Authenticated ← identity established ↓ Proposed action ← DROP TABLE production_customers ↓ CoreGuard ← deterministic policy evaluation ↓ ALLOW / BLOCK / MODIFY ← no LLM in this decision ↓ Execution boundary ← a BLOCK never crosses it ↓ Signed evidence